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Have Acquisitions of Failed Banks Increased the
Concentration of U.S. Banking Markets? 
David C. Wheelock
During 2007-10, failures eliminated 318 U.S. commercial banks and savings institutions, about 
4 percent of the total number of banks operating at the end of 2006. The assets and deposits of
many failed banks were acquired by institutions that already had offices in markets served by the
failed banks. This article investigates the impact of in-market acquisitions of failed banks on the
concentration of local U.S. banking markets. Most banks that failed during 2007-10 were small,
and their acquisitions generally had little impact on market concentration. Acquisitions of larger
banks that failed, such as the acquisition of Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan Chase Bank, also
had only limited impact on the concentration of most banking markets. Among large metropolitan
statistical area markets, the Houston and New York City banking markets were most affected by
the acquisition of Washington Mutual, but these markets remained relatively unconcentrated after
the acquisition. Hence, the article finds that except for a few rural banking markets, acquisitions of
failed banks by in-market competitors generally had only a small impact on market concentration.
(JEL G21, G28, G34, L11, L41)
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ment authorities regularly examine all banks,
especially those that have sustained substantial
losses or show other signs of weakness that might
lead to failure. Insolvent banks, or banks that
appear in imminent danger of becoming insolvent,
may be declared failed by their primary regulator
in conjunction with the FDIC. The FDIC acts as
the receiver or liquidating agent for federally
insured banks that fail and is required by law to
resolve each failure in the manner that imposes
the least cost on the deposit insurance system.
T
he financial crisis and recession of
2007-09 brought a sharp increase in the
number of depository institution failures
in the United States and elsewhere.
Between January 1, 2007, and December 31, 2010,
a total of 318 U.S. commercial banks and savings
institutions (hereafter “banks”) failed—nearly 
4 percent of the total number in operation on
December 31, 2006. Failed banks held approxi-
mately $436 billion of deposits—nearly 6 per-
cent of the total deposits held in U.S. banks on
December 31, 2006.1
Compared with firms in most other industries,
banks are heavily regulated and supervised by
government authorities. Furthermore, their prin-
cipal form of liabilities—customer deposits—are
insured by a government agency, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). Govern  -
1 Data on failed bank and savings institution deposits are from
their last available quarterly statement of condition before failure.
The data reported here are for failures of U.S. chartered commer-
cial banks and savings institutions located in the 50 states and
Washington, D.C., and exclude data for Puerto Rico and other U.S.
territories, as well as for one bankers’ bank, one cooperative bank,
and two industrial banks that failed during the period and appear
in the list of bank failures on the FDIC website
(www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html).
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resolved through a “purchase and assumption”
(P&A) transaction in which some or all of the
assets of the failed bank are sold to a healthy bank,
which may also assume some or all of the failed
bank’s liabilities, including all insured deposits.2
The FDIC solicits bids from potential acquirers
and is required by law to select the qualifying bid
that imposes the least cost on the deposit insur-
ance fund. (The FDIC usually pays the acquirer
an amount based on the excess of the value of
liabilities it assumes over the value of the assets
or enters into a loss-sharing agreement with the
acquiring bank.) Occasionally, however, failed
banks are liquidated, with the FDIC paying off
insured depositors and liquidating all of the failed
bank’s assets. Among the 318 failures noted above,
299 were resolved through P&A transactions and
19 were resolved through a deposit payoff and
liquidation or other means.3
This article examines how acquisitions of
failed banks during 2007-10 affected the con-
centration of local U.S. banking markets. Con  -
centration measures are used often to gauge the
competitiveness of markets. Although the threat
of entry by potential competitors may deter firms
from exerting market power in industries with a
small number of firms—even just one firm—a
high degree of concentration is often taken as a
sign of a lack of competition in a market.4 Further,
researchers have found that banks in more con-
centrated local markets tend to charge higher
interest rates on loans and pay lower rates on
deposits. They also tend to behave more conser-
vatively and be less cost efficient than banks in
less concentrated markets.5 Bank regulators use
Department of Justice guidelines for market con-
centration to evaluate the competitive effects of
proposed bank mergers and acquisitions. Proposed
transactions that would increase market concen-
tration significantly are subject to more scrutiny
and are more likely to be rejected on antitrust
grounds than transactions that would not increase
concentration significantly.6 In compiling lists of
potential bidders for failed banks, the FDIC con-
siders market competition, as well as other factors.
However, the FDIC does not automatically reject
bids that would increase market concentration
significantly. 
Bank regulators use data on deposits held at
bank branch offices to measure the concentration
of local banking markets. Similarly, this article
uses these data to examine how acquisitions of
failed banks have affected the concentration of
local U.S. banking markets. The merger of two
banks with no geographic markets in common
will have no effect on the concentration of any
local banking markets. However, acquirers of
many failed banks have branches in markets
served by the failed bank. This article investigates
how such transactions have affected the concen-
tration of local banking markets by comparing the
actual levels of concentration in those markets
before a bank failure with hypothetical, or “pro
forma,” levels constructed by treating the acquir-
ing and failed banks as having merged before the
date of failure. Further, for markets with many
bank failures or especially large increases in con-
centration, the article evaluates how all failed
bank acquisitions by in-market competitors since
2007 affected concentration. Although acquisi-
tions of failed banks by in-market competitors
produced large increases in concentration in a
few, mainly rural, banking markets, such acqui-
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2 Often, however, acquirers do not purchase the brokered deposits,
whether insured or not, of failed banks.
3 A few of the 19 bank failures not resolved through standard P&As
were temporarily transferred to bridge banks, which are new,
temporary national banks controlled by the FDIC. The FDIC uses
bridge banks to provide the time needed to arrange a permanent
transaction to resolve a failed bank. The FDIC considers bridge
banks a form of P&A transactions. However, this article focuses on
the impact of acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors
and, hence, does not consider the implications of bridge bank res-
olutions. Additional information about the resolution of failed
banks can be found in the FDIC Resolutions Handbook
(www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/).
4 If markets are “contestable” (i.e., if barriers to entry and exit are
sufficiently low), then even a monopolist is unable to earn excess
profits in the long run because other firms will enter and drive
down the market price if the incumbent firm sets its price above
marginal cost (Baumol, Panzar, and Willig, 1988). 
5 Gilbert (1984) provides a comprehensive review of research on
bank market structure and competition through the early 1980s,
and Berger et al. (2004) review more recent research on the rela-
tionships between market concentration, competition, and bank
performance.
6 See Gilbert and Zaretsky (2003) for more on the use of concentra-
tion in the competitive analysis of proposed bank mergers and
acquisitions.sitions did not substantially affect concentration
in most U.S. banking markets.
The next section reports summary information
about banks that failed during 2007-10 and the
institutions that acquired them. Subsequently,
the article investigates the impact of acquisitions
of failed banks by in-market competitors on the
concentration of local banking markets. The arti-
cle identifies markets where such acquisitions
resulted in large increases in concentration, as
well as the effect of in-market acquisitions of failed
banks on concentration in markets that had many
failures or especially large increases in concen-
tration. The final section presents conclusions.
ACQUIRERS OF FAILED BANKS 
The majority (94 percent) of the 318 failures
of U.S. banks between January 1, 2007, and
December 31, 2010, were resolved by P&A trans-
actions. In total, 178 banks acquired some or all
of the assets and liabilities of one or more failed
banks during this period. In general, the acquirers
of failed banks were larger, in terms of both total
assets and deposits, and operated more branch
offices in more banking markets than failed banks.
Table 1 lists the 10 largest failed banks and 10
largest acquirers of failed banks during 2007-10,
based on total assets on June 30, 2006. Washington
Mutual Bank, a federally chartered savings bank
with $350.9 billion of assets on June 30, 2006, was
the largest bank that failed during the period. Its
acquirer, JPMorgan Chase Bank, had $1.1 trillion
of assets on June 30, 2006, and was the largest
acquirer of one or more failed banks during the
2007-10 period.
Table 2 reports summary information, as of
June 30, 2006, for all failed banks and their acquir-
ers.7 Information for failed commercial banks
and savings institutions is reported separately.
Savings institutions traditionally have focused
on residential mortgage lending, and many expe-
rienced large losses when mortgage delinquencies
rose during 2007-10. Several large savings insti-
tutions, including Washington Mutual Bank, failed
during this period. Although many commercial
banks also succumbed to the downturn in real
estate markets, failed commercial banks tended
to be smaller than failed savings institutions. The
average (median) total assets and deposits of failed
savings institutions were $9.5 billion ($352 mil-
lion) and $5.6 billion ($307 million), respectively,
whereas the comparable figures for failed com-
mercial banks were $628 million ($223 million)
and $478 million ($185 million).
Acquirers of failed institutions, which
included both commercial banks and savings
institutions, often were much larger than the firms
they acquired. The average (median) total assets
and deposits of acquiring institutions were $14.7
billion ($649 million) and $7.8 billion ($466 mil-
lion), respectively. Acquirers also tended to oper-
ate more branch offices in more geographic areas
than acquired banks. The largest acquirer (in terms
of number of branches) operated 2,679 branches
in 17 states and another operated branches in 26
states. The median number of branches operated
by acquirers was 11 branches. Although the largest
failed banks also had many branch offices, the
median number of branches operated by failed
commercial banks and savings institutions were
3 and 7, respectively, and most failed institutions
operated branches in fewer unique zip code





When it compiles a list of potential acquirers
for a failed bank, the FDIC “takes into account
the failed institution’s geographic location, com-
petitive environment, minority-owned status,
Wheelock
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8 See Aubuchon and Wheelock (2010) for more information about
the characteristics of banks that failed during 2007-10.
7 The first bank failure during 2007-10 occurred in February 2007
and, hence, I use data from June 30, 2006, in compiling the summary
information presented in Table 2. Although there were 318 failed
banks during the period, nine of those banks were chartered after
June 30, 2006, and thus the summary information in Table 2 is
based on data for only 258 failed commercial banks and 51 failed
savings institutions. Likewise, 12 of the 178 acquirers were char-
tered after June 30, 2006, and hence the summary information for



























































Ten Largest Failed Banks and Acquiring Institutions (January 2007–December 2010), by Total Assets on June 30, 2006
Total assets  Total deposits  Total zip codes  Total counties  Total states 
Name of institution ($ thousands) ($ thousands) Total branches with a branch with a branch with a branch
Failed banks
Washington Mutual Bank, FSB 350,890,182 210,626,236 2,167 1,745 199 15
Colonial Bank, NA 22,962,845 16,242,689 301 267 74 5
IndyMac Bank, FSB 22,743,262 9,575,579 26 25 4 1
Downey Savings and Loan Association 17,464,594 11,936,431 172 154 20 2
Guaranty Bank 16,920,624 9,362,598 152 149 49 2
Ohio Savings Bank, FSB* 16,605,531 11,188,582 56 52 8 3
BankUnited, FSB 12,866,372 6,014,740 73 62 11 1
First Federal Bank of California, FSB 10,256,842 5,542,113 32 28 2 1
Corus Bank, NA 9,369,988 8,320,397 14 10 1 1
United Commercial Bank 8,280,022 5,497,301 47 36 14 4
Acquiring institutions
JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA 1,144,680,000 434,752,000 2,679 1,783 283 17
U.S. Bank, NA 212,553,949 117,337,830 2,525 1,873 553 26
SunTrust Bank 181,442,168 117,956,301 1,758 1,130 249 12
PNC Bank, NA 85,946,560 58,134,805 831 588 77 9
Branch Banking and Trust Company 85,214,955 51,246,133 918 718 239 10
Regions Bank 81,954,710 57,231,022 1,397 1,039 398 15
ING Bank, FSB 60,922,260 46,440,495 1 1 1 1
Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company 55,789,617 35,227,118 683 492 101 7
Union Bank, NA 50,054,634 39,743,303 340 296 40 3
Fifth Third Bank 48,259,297 38,388,498 749 547 133 6
NOTE: *On the date of its failure, Ohio Savings Bank was known as AmTrust Bank. 



























































Descriptive Statistics for Failed Banks and Acquiring Institutions (January 2007–December 2010)
Total assets  Total deposits  Total zip codes  Total counties  Total states 
Type of bank ($ thousands) ($ thousands) Total branches with a branch with a branch with a branch
Failed commercial banks (258 banks)
Min 11,073 3,264 1 1 1 1
Max 22,962,845 16,242,689 301 267 74 5
Mean 628,081 478,117 7.1 6.2 2.7 1.1
Q1 94,722 74,991 1 1 1 1
Median 223,099 185,124 3 3 2 1
Q3 490,770 380,402 7 6 3 1
SD 1,769,355 1,288,289 20.5 18.0 5.1 0.5
Failed savings institutions (51 banks)
Min 5,927 3,264 1 1 1 1
Max 350,890,182 210,626,236 2,167 1,745 199 15  
Mean 9,494,080 5,648,601 60.3 50.4 9.1 1.7
Q1 112,088 84,525 1 1 1 1
Median 351,608 307,481 7 7 2 1
Q3 1,765,954 1,327,204 20 15 5 2
SD 49,046,846 29,423,941 302.8 244.0 28.5 2.1
Acquiring institutions (166 banks)
Min 14,709 7,916 1 1 1 1
Max 1,144,680,000 434,752,000 2,679 1,873 553 26
Mean 14,693,641 7,840,964 106.3 77.8 20.9 2.0
Q1 224,488 160,555 4 4 2 1
Median 648,627 465,562 11 9 4 1
Q3 2,664,282 2,345,542 43 33 12 2
SD 91,894,739 36,986,975 353.1 248.8 64.0 3.0
NOTE: Data are for June 30, 2006; Q1 and Q3 are values for the first and third quartiles of the distribution of the data; and SD is the standard deviation of the data.
SOURCE: FDIC, Summary of Deposits.overall financial condition, asset size, capital
level, and regulatory ratings” (FDIC, Resolutions
Handbook, p. 9). A bank with significant opera-
tions in the markets served by a failed bank might
be willing to bid more than other banks for the
assets of the failed bank for several reasons. For
example, an in-market bidder might have more
information about the local market and the failed
bank’s customers, and thereby be able to serve
those customers at lower cost than other potential
bidders. The cost of absorbing the operations of
the failed bank might also be lower for a local bid-
der. Further, a local bank might purchase a failed
competitor to deter entry by outside competitors.
Many failed bank resolutions during 2007-10
involved the acquisition of some or all of the
assets and deposits of the failed bank by an in-
market competitor (i.e., another bank that already
operated at least one branch in markets served
by the failed bank). Only 2 of 7 failures between
January 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008, were resolved
by a P&A transaction in which an in-market com-
petitor acquired the failed bank. However, 43 of
65 failures between July 1, 2008, and June 30,
2009; 84 of 175 failures between July 1, 2009, and
June 30, 2010; and 42 of 71 failures between July 1,
2010, and December 31, 2010, were resolved by
a P&A in which an in-market competitor acquired
the failed bank. Thus, a majority of failed bank
resolutions during 2007-10 resulted in some con-
solidation of banking assets and deposits in local
banking markets.9
Measures of market concentration, such as 
n-firm concentration ratios and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI), are used often to help
evaluate the competitiveness of banking and other
markets. Banks are required to report the amount
of deposits held by each of their branch offices on
June 30 of each year.10 To enforce antitrust laws,
bank regulators use these data to consider how
proposed bank mergers would affect the concen-
tration of bank deposits in local banking markets.
Ordinarily, proposed mergers are not challenged
on competitive grounds unless they would result
in a post-merger HHI value of more than 1800
points and an increase in the index of more than
200 points.11 These guidelines are not binding
on the resolution of failed banks, but as noted
previously, the FDIC does consider the competi-
tiveness of banking markets when compiling lists
of potential bidders for failed banks.
Similar to the approach used by bank regula-
tors in antitrust enforcement, I estimate the impact
of failed bank acquisitions on the concentration
of local banking markets by comparing the actual
values for each market in which both banks had
branches with the pro forma HHI values calcu-
lated under the assumption that the acquiring
and failed banks had merged before the bank
failure. Obviously, the merger of two banks that
share no geographic markets will have no impact
on the HHI values of any local banking markets.
However, the merger of banks that operate in the
same markets will, all else equal, reduce the num-
ber of banks in those markets and increase the
deposits held by the acquiring bank, and thereby
increase the value of the HHI.
Estimates of market concentration, such as
the HHI, require data on the allocation of customer
deposits across bank branches. For banking mar-
kets (metropolitan statistical areas [MSAs] or
county) in which an acquisition of a failed bank
occurred, I use these data to calculate HHI values
for the June 30 immediately preceding a bank’s
failure. For example, I use branch-level deposits
data from June 30, 2007, to calculate HHI values
for all markets in which one or more banks that
failed between July 1, 2007, and June 30, 2008,
were acquired by in-market competitors. I then
compare actual HHI values for June 30, 2007, with
Wheelock
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9 This article uses the common definition of banking markets as
either metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) or non-MSA counties.
However, some U.S. banking markets are defined by regulators to
encompass larger or smaller areas, and market definitions are some-
times changed to reflect changes in commuting patterns, popula-
tion growth, and so on. Current definitions for all U.S. banking
markets are available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(http://cassidi.stlouisfed.org/).
10 These data are available from the FDIC
(http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp). 
11 The HHI is calculated as the sum of the squared market shares of
each firm competing in a market—that is, HHI = Σi market sharei
2,
where there are i = 1,…,n firms in the market and market sharei is
the percentage of market output (deposits in the present context)
produced by the ith firm. Guide  lines for the use of the HHI in anti  -
trust enforcement are established by the Department of Justice
(www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/6472.htm).pro forma values calculated under the assumption
that the failed and acquiring banks had already
been operating as a single institution on that date.12
Most acquisitions of failed banks by in-market
competitors during 2007-10 did not result in a
substantial increase in local market concentra-
tion. Comparing actual HHI values on the June 30
before a bank failure with pro forma values
derived by assuming that the failed bank and its
acquirer had already merged, I find that acquisi-
tions of failed banks by in-market competitors
resulted in an average increase in HHI value of
54.1 points and a median increase of just 1.3
points. Further, I estimate that the acquisition of
a failed bank by an in-market competitor increased
the HHI value by more than 200 points in only
21 markets, which are listed in Table 3. As shown
in the table, the 15 markets with the largest differ-
ence between the pro forma HHI and pre-failure
HHI values (i.e., difference between “Pro Forma
HHI” and “HHI Before Acquisition”) are all
sparsely populated non-MSA counties. Trans  -
actions resulting in a difference greater than 200
points also occurred in six MSAs, five of which
are relatively small.13
Whereas Table 3 lists markets where the differ-
ences between the hypothetical and pre-failure
HHI values exceed 200 points, Table 4 lists mar-
kets where the pre-failure HHI exceeded 1800
points, which is the level at which the Department
of Justice considers a market to be concentrated.
Terrell County, Texas, was the most concentrated
U.S. banking market in which a failed bank was
acquired by another in-market bank. Sanderson
State Bank, which held 95.4 percent of the
county’s bank deposits on June 30, 2008, was
closed by the Texas Department of Banking on
December 12, 2008. The FDIC sold all of the failed
bank’s assets and deposits to The Pecos County
State Bank, which as the only other bank with
offices in Terrell County, held 4.6 percent of the
county’s deposits on June 30, 2008. The acquisi-
tion of Sanderson State Bank by its sole in-market
competitor increased the HHI value for Terrell
County by 875 points, from 9125 to 10000 points.
Besides Terrell County, Texas, 12 other coun-
ties had market HHI values greater than 1800 on
the June 30 before a bank failure and experienced
an increase in HHI value of more than 200 points
due to the acquisition of a failed bank by an in-
market competitor. Of course, the fact that these
counties had highly concentrated banking mar-
kets that were made even more concentrated by
the acquisition of failed banks does not imply that
the FDIC ignored the competitive environment
in soliciting bids for failed banks. Market com-
petition is only one consideration in identifying
potential bidders for failed banks, and the FDIC
is required to pursue the least costly resolution
of bank failures.14
Next, I examine the impact of acquisitions of
failed banks in banking markets that had multiple
in-market acquisitions within a 12-month period.
Table 5 lists the markets with at least four such
acquisitions. For example, between July 1, 2009,
and June 30, 2010, there were 15 acquisitions of
failed banks with offices in the Chicago MSA by
banks that also had offices in Chicago on June 30,
2009. None of the failed banks had a large share
of the Chicago banking market. Corus Bank, NA,
had the largest share at only 2.5 percent. Among
the acquiring banks, Harris Bank, NA, had the
largest share of the Chicago market’s bank deposits
on June 30, 2009, at 8.6 percent. I estimate that
Wheelock
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12 Regulators weight the deposits of savings institutions by 0.5 when
calculating HHI values for use in competitive analysis of local bank-
ing markets, reflecting a presumption that deposits at savings
institutions are similar, but not perfect, substitutes for deposits at
commercial banks. For this article, however, I assign full weight to
savings institutions’ deposits when calculating HHI values. Since
the article focuses primarily on changes in HHI due to acquisitions
of failed banks, the choice of how to weight savings institutions
deposits is largely immaterial.
13 In calculating pro forma HHI values, I assume that acquirers pur-
chase all of the deposits of failed banks, which I estimate to equal
deposits held on the most recent June 30 before failure. However,
acquirers sometimes purchase less than the total deposits of failed
banks, and the deposits of failed banks on the date of failure can
differ substantially from the amount held by the bank on the prior
June 30. Hence, the pro forma HHI values presented in this article
are estimates of the effect of in-market acquisitions on market
concentration that may overstate or understate the true effect.
14 As shown in Table 4, some MSA banking markets have exception-
ally large HHI values. However, most of these markets include the
headquarters of a large national financial institution that assigns a
large share of its customer deposits to the headquarters location.
Because this skews measures of market concentration for those
markets, regulators attempt to estimate the share of locally gener-
ated deposits in such organizations when evaluating the competi-
tive implications of proposed mergers in affected markets. This
article makes no such attempt.the 15 acquisitions as a whole increased the HHI
value for the Chicago market by just 24 points,
from 563 to 587 points. Among the banking mar-
kets noted in Table 5, San Diego had the largest
estimated increase in HHI, at just 46 points. Hence,
the evidence for markets with multiple in-market
acquisitions of failed banks during a 12-month
period indicates that the concentration of those
markets was not substantially affected by the
acquisitions. 
Table 6 lists the markets with at least five
acquisitions of failed banks by in-market com-
petitors over the entire period from January 1,
2007, through December 31, 2010. To gauge the
impact of all acquisitions during the period on
market concentration, I compare the actual HHI
values for June 30, 2006, with pro forma values
constructed under the assumption that the failed
banks and their acquirers had merged before that
date. The difference between the “HHI After
Acquisitions” and “Pro Forma HHI,” therefore,
provides an estimate of the impact of all in-market
acquisitions of failed banks during 2007-10 on
market concentration. For example, 22 banks with
Wheelock
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Table 3
Markets Where Acquisition of a Failed Bank Increased HHI by at Least 200 Points 
Failed bank  Acquirer  HHI before  Pro forma  Difference 
Market market share (%) market share (%) acquisition* HHI† in HHI
County markets
Camden, GA 39.2 14.3 2232 3352 1120
McDowell, WV 31.6 17.7 3882 5001 1119
Kay, OK 19.3 25.9 1622 2624 1002
Gilmer, GA 10.2 49.0 3010 4007 997
Terrell, TX 95.4 4.6 9125 10000 875
Crenshaw, AL 11.6 35.6 2349 3178 829
Holt, NE 12.1 32.1 2148 2927 779
Wharton, TX 13.5 28.3 1638 2405 767
Elko, NV 40.1 7.3 2329 2912 583
Montgomery, IA 9.8 28.6 2397 2957 560
Blaine, ID 43.5 5.2 2551 3001 450
Jo Daviess, IL 7.0 28.5 2084 2483 399
Tift, GA 16.7 10.8 2088 2448 360
Banks, GA 11.7 14.9 3066 3416 350
Duplin, NC 12.1 14.2 1990 2334 344
MSA markets
Bremerton, WA 8.8 18.6 1214 1542 328
Houston, TX 5.0 29.5 1161 1454 293
Anniston, AL 13.6 10.4 1324 1606 282
Columbus, IN 67.4 1.8 4822 5062 240
Beaumont, TX 7.7 14.5 1051 1274 223
Mount Vernon, WA 8.3 13.3 1026 1246 220
NOTE: *HHI before acquisition is the value of the HHI in the market on June 30 of the year before the bank failure. †Pro forma HHI is
a hypothetical value of HHI calculated under the assumption that the failed bank and acquirer had operated as a single institution on
June 30 of the year before the failure.Wheelock
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Table 4
Highly Concentrated Banking Markets (HHI > 1800) Where a Failed Bank Was Acquired by a
Competitor
Failed bank  Acquirer  HHI before  Pro forma  Difference 
Market market share (%) market share (%) acquisition† HHI‡ in HHI
County markets
Terrell, TX 95.4 4.6 9125 10000 875
McDowell, WV 31.6 17.7 3882 5001 1119
Banks, GA 11.7 14.9 3066 3416 350
Gilmer, GA 10.2 49.0 3010 4007 997
Blaine, ID 43.5 5.2 2551 3001 450
Chesterfield, SC 3.1 20.1 2397 2522 125
Montgomery, IA 9.8 28.6 2397 2957 560
Crenshaw, AL 11.6 35.6 2349 3178 829
Elko, NV 40.1 7.3 2329 2912 583
Camden, GA 39.2 14.3 2232 3352 1120
Holt, NE 12.1 32.1 2148 2927 779
Tift, GA 16.7 10.8 2088 2448 360
Jo Daviess, IL 7.0 28.5 2084 2483 399
Duplin, NC 12.1 14.2 1990 2334 344
Martinsville, VA 1.5 6.4 1958 1977 19
MSA markets
Reno, NV 0.0* 0.0* 6803 6803 0
Bloomington, IL 1.8 3.0 6528 6538 10
Ogden, UT 0.0* 0.0* 5632 5633 1
Columbus, IN 67.4 1.8 4822 5062 240
Columbus, IN 5.5 1.8 4822 4841 19
Las Vegas, NV 0.0* 0.0* 4658 4658 0
Las Vegas, NV 0.0* 0.0* 4658 4658 0
San Antonio, TX 0.0* 0.0* 3749 3750 1
San Antonio, TX 0.0* 2.0 3749 3752 3
San Antonio, TX 0.0* 2.2 3590 3592 2
Las Vegas, NV 1.0 1.4 3129 3131 2
Trenton, NJ 0.0* 0.0* 2978 2978 0
Jacksonville, FL 0.0* 0.0* 2665 2665 0
Buffalo, NY 0.0* 1.2 2514 2514 0
Minneapolis, MN 0.0* 0.0* 2254 2254 0
Merced, CA 38.9 2.0 2161 2317 156
Jacksonville, FL 0.0* 1.1 2110 2110 0
Cincinnati, OH 0.0* 0.0* 2028 2028 0
Racine, WI 7.6 0.0* 1967 1974 7
Minneapolis, MN 0.0* 0.0* 1873 1873 0
Minneapolis, MN 0.0* 0.0* 1873 1874 1
Minneapolis, MN 0.0* 0.0* 1873 1873 0
Minneapolis, MN 0.0* 0.0* 1873 1873 0
Minneapolis, MN 0.0* 0.0* 1873 1873 0
Dallas, TX 1.8 2.9 1855 1866 11
Dallas, TX 0.0* 0.0* 1855 1855 0
Cincinnati, OH 1.0 2.7 1813 1818 5
NOTE: *Less than 1 percent. †HHI before acquisition is the value of the HHI in the market on June 30 of the year before the bank
failure. ‡Pro forma HHI is a hypothetical value of HHI calculated under the assumption that the failed bank and acquirer had operated
as a single institution on June 30 of the year before the failure.offices in Chicago that failed during 2007-10 were
acquired by banks that also had offices in Chicago.
If those failed banks and their acquirers had
already merged by June 30, 2006, the estimated
HHI for the Chicago market would have been 633
points (“Pro Forma HHI”). By contrast, the actual
HHI for the Chicago market on June 30, 2006, was
600 points (“HHI Before Acquisitions”). Hence, I
estimate that the acquisitions of the 22 failed banks
by in-market competitors increased the HHI of the
Chicago market by 33 points, or about 5.5 percent.
Among the markets listed in Table 6, Houston
experienced the largest impact of such acquisitions
on market concentration. I estimate the acquisi-
tions of failed banks by in-market competitors
increased the HHI of the Houston market by 323
points, or 27.8 percent. The next-largest impact
was in the New York City market, where failed
bank acquisitions increased the HHI by 112 points,
or 9.9 percent. In both cases, the acquisition of
Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan Chase
Bank was the main reason for the increase in
HHI. The HHI values for both the Houston and
New York City markets remained below 1800
after the acquisition, however, indicating that
neither market was particularly concentrated.
Finally, I investigate the contribution of acqui-
sitions of failed banks by in-market competitors
to changes in the concentration of individual bank-
ing markets between 2006 and 2010. The median
increase in HHI between June 2006 and June 2010
across all markets in which a failed bank was
acquired by an in-market competitor was 90
points. I estimate that, absent acquisitions of failed
banks by in-market competitors, the median
increase in HHI would have been 10 points.15
However, such acquisitions account for a much
smaller percentage of the increase in HHI among
most MSA markets than among rural markets.
Among the 89 MSAs with in-market acquisitions
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Table 5
Markets with Four or More Acquisitions of Failed Banks by Competitors in a Single Year
No. of  HHI before  Pro forma  Difference 
Market* Year† acquisitions acquisitions‡ HHI§ in HHI
Chicago, IL 2009-10 15 563 587 24
Los Angeles, CA 2009-10 9 888 915 27
Atlanta, GA 2008-09 7 1270 1279 9
Los Angeles, CA 2008-09 7 774 781 7
Atlanta, GA 2010 7 1248 1249 1
Seattle, WA 2009-10 6 1097 1101 4
Miami, FL 2009-10 5 741 743 2
Minneapolis, MN 2009-10 5 1873 1874 1
Riverside, CA 2009-10 5 1011 1015 4
San Francisco, CA 2009-10 5 1708 1714 6
Chicago, IL 2008-09 4 537 554 17
Atlanta, GA 2009-10 4 1181 1186 5
San Diego, CA 2009-10 4 1029 1075 46
NOTE: *All markets with four or more acquisitions are MSAs. †Years are the 12-month periods July 1, 2008–June 30, 2009, and July 1, 2009–
June 30, 2010, and the 6-month period July 1, 2010–December 31, 2010. ‡HHI before acquisitions is the value of the HHI in the market
on June 30 of the year before the bank failures. §Pro forma HHI is a hypothetical value of HHI calculated under the assumption that
the failed banks and their acquirers had operated as combined institutions on June 30 of the year before the failures.
15 This is the median across all markets of the difference between HHI
for June 2010 and a pro forma value for June 2006 constructed
under the assumption that all failed banks and their acquirers had
merged before June 30, 2006.of failed banks, the median increase in HHI was
78 points. I estimate that absent such acquisitions,
the median HHI would have increased by 50
points. By contrast, among the 27 rural markets
where such acquisitions occurred, the median
increase in HHI between 2006 and 2010 was 113
points. Absent those acquisitions, I estimate that
the median change in HHI across those markets
would have been a decline of 149 points. Thus,
the effect of in-market acquisitions of failed banks
on the concentration of rural banking markets
was, on average, much greater than the effect of
such acquisitions on the concentration of MSA
markets.
Table 7 lists markets where the HHI value
increased by at least 500 points between June 30,
2006, and June 30, 2010, and at least one failed
bank was acquired by an in-market competitor.
The table also shows pro forma HHI values on
June 30, 2006, calculated under the assumption
that banks that failed during 2007-10 had merged
with their in-market acquirers before June 30,
2006 (“Pro Forma HHI 2006”). In four markets
listed in Table 7, the in-market acquirers of failed
banks did not have a presence on June 30, 2006,
and, hence, the pro forma HHI values for 2006
are identical to the actual values. In a few rural-
county markets, acquisitions of failed banks by
in-market competitors can explain a high percent-
age of the actual increase in HHI value between
2006 and 2010. For example, for the Crenshaw
County, Alabama, banking market, the actual HHI
values in 2006 and 2010 were 2194 and 3382
points, respectively. The pro forma HHI value for
Crenshaw County in 2006 is 3100 points. Thus,
I estimate that the in-market acquisition con-
tributed 906 points, or 76 percent, of the 1188-
point increase in HHI value for Crenshaw County
between 2006 and 2010. Similarly, I estimate that
an in-market acquisition contributed 1012 points,
or 88 percent, of the 1148-point increase in HHI
value for McDowell County, West Virginia,
between 2006 and 2010. Other counties for which
in-market acquisitions account for large shares
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Table 6
Markets with at Least Five Acquisitions of Failed Banks by In-Market Competitors (2007-10)
No. of  HHI before 
Market* acquisitions acquisitions† Pro forma HHI‡ Difference in HHI
Chicago, IL 22 600 633 33
Atlanta, GA 18 1412 1421 9
Los Angeles, CA 18 783 799 16
Seattle, WA 10 1330 1335 5
Miami, FL 8 833 836 3
Minneapolis, MN 7 1566 1567 1
San Francisco, CA 7 1372 1375 3
Riverside, CA 7 939 945 6
Kansas City, MO 6 408 409 1
Phoenix, AZ 5 1510 1604 94
Detroit, MI 5 1427 1430 3
Houston, TX 5 1160 1483 323
New York, NY 5 1131 1243 112
San Diego, CA 5 1001 1049 48
NOTE: *All markets with at least five acquisitions are MSAs. †HHI before acquisitions is the value of the HHI in the market on June 30,
2006. ‡Pro forma HHI is a hypothetical value of HHI for June 30, 2006, calculated under the assumption that the failed banks and their
acquirers had operated as combined institutions on that date.of the actual increases in HHI values include Jo
Daviess County, Illinois; Wharton County, Texas;
Holt County, Nebraska; and Elko County, Nevada.16
Aside from the few cases noted above, acqui-
sitions of failed banks by in-market competitors
can explain relatively little of the increase in HHI
value between 2006 and 2010 for most markets,
especially MSA markets. Among MSA markets
where in-market acquirers of failed banks had
offices on June 30, 2006, the largest difference
between the actual and pro forma HHI values for
2006 is a mere 13 points for the Cincinnati, Ohio,
market.
CONCLUSION
The structure of the U.S. banking industry
has changed dramatically since the mid-1980s,
when the number of U.S. banks reached a post-
World War II peak. Advances in information-
processing technology and the removal of most
legal barriers to branch banking have been the
main drivers of a substantial consolidation of the
banking industry (Berger, 2003). Much of the
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Table 7
Markets with an HHI Increase of at Least 500 Points (2006-10)
Increase in HHI 
Increase in  Pro forma  due to acquisitions 
Market HHI 2006* HHI 2010† HHI, 2006-10 HHI 2006‡ of failed banks
County markets
Terrell, TX 5104 10000 4896 5104 —
Crenshaw, AL 2194 3382 1188 3100 906
McDowell, WV 3996 5144 1148 5008 1012
Jo Daviess, IL 1821 2574 753 2276 455
Wharton, TX 1735 2363 628 2520 785
Holt, NE 2193 2803 610 2966 773
Montgomery, IA 2415 2940 525 2415 —
Elko, NV 2007 2522 515 2518 511
MSA markets
Reno, NV 3462 7247 3785 3462 —
Las Vegas, NV 4812 6209 1397 4815 3
San Antonio, TX 2946 4066 1120 2953 7
San Francisco, CA 1372 2332 960 1375 3
Pittsburgh, PA 1520 2431 911 1521 1
Ogden, UT 5762 6658 896 5763 1
Carson City, NV 1060 1934 874 1060 —
Jacksonville, FL 1929 2665 736 1930 1
Minneapolis, MN 1566 2254 688 1567 1
Cincinnati, OH 1442 2028 586 1455 13
NOTE: *HHI 2006 is the value of the HHI on June 30, 2006. †HHI 2010 is the value of the HHI on June 30, 2010. ‡Pro forma HHI 2006 is
a hypothetical value of HHI for June 30, 2006, calculated under the assumption that the failed banks and their acquirers had operated
as combined institutions on that date.
16 Acquisitions of failed banks by in-market competitors can explain
more than 100 percent of the actual increases in HHI values, as
they do for Wharton County, Texas, and Holt County, Nebraska,
because other factors, including changes in relative market shares
of other banks, offset the impact of acquisitions of failed banks. consolidation has taken the form of mergers of
solvent banks. However, waves of failures, both
in the late 1980s and early 1990s and again in
the wake of the financial crisis and recession of
2007-09, also contributed to industry consolida-
tion and, at least in some markets, substantial
increases in concentration.17
Failures eliminated 318 U.S. banks during
2007-10, or about 4 percent of the total number
of banks operating at the end of 2006. The assets
and deposits of 171 of those failed banks were
acquired by institutions that already had branches
in markets served by the failed bank. Those acqui-
sitions contributed to increased concentration of
local banking markets. However, this article finds
that except for a few rural banking markets, acqui-
sitions of failed banks by in-market competitors
generally had only a small impact on market
concentration. Most banks that failed during
2007-10 were small, and although many of those
banks were acquired by much larger institutions,
those acquisitions generally had little impact on
market concentration. Acquisitions of larger banks
that failed during 2007-10, such as the acquisi-
tion of Washington Mutual Bank by JPMorgan
Chase Bank, also had only limited impact on the
concentration in most of the banking markets
involved. Among large MSAs, the Houston and
New York City banking markets were most affected
by the acquisition of Washington Mutual but both
remained relatively unconcentrated after the
acquisition.18
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17 Data from the 1990s indicate that branching deregulation and
industry consolidation did not generally increase the concentra-
tion of local urban banking markets, though it did increase con-
centration over larger geographic regions (Dick, 2006).
18 This article does not investigate the impact on market concentra-
tion of acquisitions of certain distressed commercial banks, such
as Countrywide Bank; Wachovia Bank, NA; and National City Bank,
which were acquired by other banks without being declared failed
and closed by regulators. Those acquisitions may have had signifi-
cant impacts on concentration in some banking markets. Although
not the subject of the present article, the data and methods used
here could be applied to investigate the effects of these and other
acquisitions on the concentration of individual banking markets.REFERENCES
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